Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East
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- Author：David Stahel
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Summary
Operation Barbarossa， the German invasion of the Soviet Union， began the largest and most costly campaign in military history。 Its failure was a key turning point of the Second World War。 The operation was planned as a Blitzkrieg to win Germany its Lebensraum in the East， and the summer of 1941 is well-known for the German army's unprecedented victories and advances。 Yet the German Blitzkrieg depended almost entirely upon the motorised Panzer groups， particularly those of Army Group Centre。 Using previously unpublished archival records， David Stahel presents a new history of Germany's summer campaign from the perspective of the two largest and most powerful Panzer groups on the Eastern front。 Stahel's research provides a fundamental reassessment of Germany's war against the Soviet Union， highlighting the prodigious internal problems of the vital Panzer forces and revealing that their demise in the earliest phase of the war undermined the whole German invasion。
Reviews
Perato
，
A book that I would have in my "shortlist of must read WW2 books" if I had one。 Even if you would only read the first 30 pages or so， would you have so much better understanding about the controversies and discussions relating to everything written about the 'Ostkrieg'。This book is based on David Stahel's doctoral dissertation that focused on the Army Group Center's attrition in the first months of Barbarossa。 While this book is titled as more broad， the focus is still pretty much the same; Germ A book that I would have in my "shortlist of must read WW2 books" if I had one。 Even if you would only read the first 30 pages or so， would you have so much better understanding about the controversies and discussions relating to everything written about the 'Ostkrieg'。This book is based on David Stahel's doctoral dissertation that focused on the Army Group Center's attrition in the first months of Barbarossa。 While this book is titled as more broad， the focus is still pretty much the same; Germany's Army Group center， and it's two Panzer groups。 His main argument is that Germany lost the war in the first months of Barbarossa even before Typhoon and this is because it's most mobile divisions where ground to near annihilation from July to august。 He also 'breaks' few myths about the Wehrmacht and the generals of it， although about 12 years later one couldn't say they're anymore groundbreaking。The research is based on a lot of different sources and he constantly evaluates the worthiness of the used source。 Also the research is not only based on just diaries and such but also statistical numbers which are very revealing just how precarious the German position was even before the invasion。 For example he has charts to explain the composition of Panzer groups tanks and their wear and tear during the offense。 Also he writes quite extensively about the supply issue how the lack of trains and trucks were a problem from the beginning of the invasion。All in all if you're only familiar with eastern front from some cheap documentaries， one get's a whole different perspective from this book。 For me this was 22nd book that covers Eastern front and yet it felt fresh and gave some food for thought。The only minor problem with the book is that， he uses maps from Glantz' that are way too tight in their scope and for my liking don't have enough information。 While the text refer's to armies and corps' by their number but also by their leader the map's only have number's。 For me the army/corps boundaries would've had to be more visible and occasionally I would've liked a map where the whole of Eastern front or bigger part of it would've been visible。 Yet in the light of how good the actual book is， it's only a minor flaw。I'm interested enough to buy his other books as well。 。。。more
Lyle Lawson
，
A very well researched and written account of "Operation Barbarossa"。 Maybe a little too deep for those not really interested in the historical event， but for those who are interested; they will find it a very good read。 A very well researched and written account of "Operation Barbarossa"。 Maybe a little too deep for those not really interested in the historical event， but for those who are interested; they will find it a very good read。 。。。more
Otto Valkamo
，
An absolutely fantastic work by Mr。 Stahel detailing the planning（or the lack thereof）， order of battle， resources， the economic， military and political situations of both countries in a neat 450-page book！ Note; This book does only cover the war from June-August， and the 2nd book of the series Kiev 1941 covers September， Operation Typhoon October and Battle for Moscow November–December。 A good read！
Kris
，
New thinking on WW II eastern frontThe newest thoughts on the eastern front war in WWII。 A insightful look at the pivotal campaign by Germany in the war and why it set up all that happened after it。
Stefania Dzhanamova
，
David Stahel's work is a detailed， step-by-step account of the planning and preparation of Operation Barbarossa， as well as the first nine weeks of the campaign。 While the great battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941/1942 is commonly considered Germany's first major defeat in the war against the Soviet Union， Stahel argues that Barbarossa was doomed to failure as early as the summer of 1941。 The author mainly focuses on the plans and actions of Army Group Center， the largest and most powerful of David Stahel's work is a detailed， step-by-step account of the planning and preparation of Operation Barbarossa， as well as the first nine weeks of the campaign。 While the great battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941/1942 is commonly considered Germany's first major defeat in the war against the Soviet Union， Stahel argues that Barbarossa was doomed to failure as early as the summer of 1941。 The author mainly focuses on the plans and actions of Army Group Center， the largest and most powerful of the three German formations， on which the critical task of defeating the mass of Soviet forces and clearing the way for an attack on Moscow depended。 Army Group Center's main strength was the multiple tanks， motorized infantry， and artillery。 From the four "panzer groups"， in which the Wermacht's motorized divisions were concentrated， Army Group Center possessed two， and upon them the success of the Barbarossa blitzkrieg was dependent。 Stahel traces this force's impressive initial success， measured by the seizure of territory and Soviet casualty rates， but underscores the fact that Operation Barbarossa was based on several flawed assumptions， and these would prove detrimental to the German campaign。 Two of those assumptions was that if the Nazi army destroyed the Red Army in the border areas， there would be little resistance as their forces proceeded to the depths of the USSR， and that the Soviets would not be able to reconstitute their armies after the first defeats。 What the Germans hadn't prepared themselves for， however， was the actual size of the Red Army， the extent of Soviet propaganda， and the overwhelming number of Russian POWs they would have to deal with。 After the Germans inflicted heavy casualties on the five-million Red Army at the border， they were more than surprised to see it grow to eight million people instead of diminishing。 Stalin had managed to effectively mobilize the whole enormous country， so the moment the Red Army was reduced by enemy forces， new troops joined。 Indeed， they were mostly ill-trained， but they were， nevertheless， "fresh meat" to hurl at the enemy。 The Germans， initially perplexed by this phenomenon， compared the Red Army to a monster， who grew additional heads the moment his old ones were cut off。 Another big problem for the Nazi army was that every village or town it arrived in was burnt and deserted by its population， urged by Soviet propaganda， leaving the Germans no victuals whatsoever， and the further they advanced into the Soviet Union， the more eager was the population to burn and desert。 in addition， the enormous number of Soviet POWs was also creating huge problems – staff officers encountered many thousands of Soviet POWs marching on the roads unsupervised， and the nearby forests were always teeming with enemy troops， a good number of whom had already been captured at some point。 The Germans had no other choice but to leave divisions behind to watch over the occupied areas。 This meant that， aside from the three security divisions already designated for the purpose， another two active divisions were withheld。 Thus， the German army was losing vital forces。 On top of that， due to the vastness of the country and the great distances （up to 90 km） the men had to cover in a single day， infantry divisions and sustainment formations trying to keep pace with the motorized forces lagged further and further behind， and as Stahel shows， the capability of the Army Centre to achieve its primary goal to seize Moscow gradually degraded。 According to him， that the German managed （hardly） to reach the Smolensk/Dnieper line without suffering a major defeat was largely due to the extraordinary incompetence of the Red Army commanders。 As Stahel reveals， from the very beginning， Adolf Hitler realized the economical limitations of his country and its inability to lead a war of attrition。 That's why the fact that in August 1941， when the supply system was heavily overextended and the Army Center's offensive strength dispersed， the generals still argued for an offensive towards Moscow demonstrates that the tragic failure to recognize the limitations of the forces under their command was inherent to the campaign itself。 David Stahel's work is extremely well-researched， although only German sources are used。 What makes it remarkable is that aside from all the other documents， the author draws upon myriad diaries and letters written by everyone from soldiers to officers to generals， adding an essential human element to his narrative。 The book is supplied with maps， which highly contribute to the understanding of the Army Center's movements。 I believe that Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East will appeal to any WWII buff not only because of its compelling style and impressive bibliography， but also because it definitely shines new light on the role Operation Barbarossa played in Nazi Germany's downfall in the East。 。。。more
Stephen Selbst
，
This is an excellent history and analysis of the German campaign to conquer Russia in 1941。 Stahel's core argument is that once Germany failed to achieve a blitzkrieg knockout of Russia in the summer of 1941， it was locked into a long war of attrition that it could never win。 Readers may quarrel with his conclusions， but his analyses are deeply researched and closely argued。 This is a coherent and lucid analysis， much of which profoundly refutes an enormous body of prior study， which had general This is an excellent history and analysis of the German campaign to conquer Russia in 1941。 Stahel's core argument is that once Germany failed to achieve a blitzkrieg knockout of Russia in the summer of 1941， it was locked into a long war of attrition that it could never win。 Readers may quarrel with his conclusions， but his analyses are deeply researched and closely argued。 This is a coherent and lucid analysis， much of which profoundly refutes an enormous body of prior study， which had generally viewed the 1941 campaign as generally successful， with the turning point of the Eastern war being Germany's defeat at Stalingrad。 Stahel identifies many critical errors that doomed the campaign， but the points he returns to are bad planning and terrible logistics。 The planning process was corrupted by the German high command's arrogant belief that the putative superiority of the German army would result in a fast collapse of the Russian forces。 That premise was quickly refuted; while the Russian military leadership was disorganized and weak， the Russians fought tenaciously and inflicted casualties that deeply weakened the German army。 Despite this mounting evidence， however， the Germans generals continued to believe the Russians were beaten and their collapse imminent。German logistics also failed in ways that undermined the war effort。 From early on， the campaign was chewing up German tanks and vehicles， both through combat and the rigors of fighting through swamps and bad roads。 The Germans failed to anticipate these problems or to address them after they developed， resulting in the German army being chronically below full fighting strength。 Even ammunition was short。The German generals were also riven by internal jealousies and disputes with Hitler over tactical objectives。Stahel makes a further point， that after the war the German generals and some historians tried to distance the army from Nazism and portray it as an honorable servant of the state。 Stahel shows that position to be false， that the high command enthusiastically supported Hitler and carried out atrocities in the Russia campaign。 Opposition to Hitler emerged only after the war was lost， he contends。Stahel's conclusion is that by failing to conquer Russia in 1941， Germany's subsequent defeat was foreordained。 Not everyone will agree with that conclusion， but all serious students of the war will recognize the powerful and persuasive scholarship that Stahel marshals to support his theories。 This is an important contribution to understanding the war in the East。 。。。more
Oolalaa
，
17/20
Benjamin
，
ExemplaryWhile I consider myself somewhat better versed in the details of the German-Soviet war than most， this bracing study broadened and deepened my understanding of this most merciless of modern conflicts。 His contention that Barbarossa’s failure doomed the German effort， Stalingrad and other assaults notwithstanding， appears ably supported by deep research and convinced me， which is always a delight。
Bhargav Indurthi
，
Very vivid and gory detail of war and it's impact especially when the leaders on both sides （Hitler & Stalin） prepared to sacrifice everything for their megalomaniac idea of human society。 The author goes to great pain to justify with facts and evidence how absurd was Hitler's ambition and Stalin's counter-strategy; with Soviet's best generals already sent to Gulag。After the first few exciting chapters about brilliant Wehrmacht strategy that lead to quick wins emerge the the horrific details。 On Very vivid and gory detail of war and it's impact especially when the leaders on both sides （Hitler & Stalin） prepared to sacrifice everything for their megalomaniac idea of human society。 The author goes to great pain to justify with facts and evidence how absurd was Hitler's ambition and Stalin's counter-strategy; with Soviet's best generals already sent to Gulag。After the first few exciting chapters about brilliant Wehrmacht strategy that lead to quick wins emerge the the horrific details。 One can't help but have an unsettling feeling in the stomach about the real consequences of a war。 In fact， I felt very sorry for those eastern Europe civilians that bore the brunt。 I couldn't help but quit reading after the middle chaptersNot for the faint of the heart。 。。。more
Andy
，
Fascinating， but Flawed。I can’t quite remember when Operation Barbarossa first started to establish itself as a major element in my intellectual and imaginative world。 Perhaps the seed was planted by Al Stewart’s song “Roads to Moscow”， or perhaps it was the “Barbarossa” episode of “The World at War”。 In any case， it was the latter that laid down the template for the dominant narrative of Barbarossa as I understood it: massive German successes in the early stages， scuppered by Hitler’s strategic Fascinating， but Flawed。I can’t quite remember when Operation Barbarossa first started to establish itself as a major element in my intellectual and imaginative world。 Perhaps the seed was planted by Al Stewart’s song “Roads to Moscow”， or perhaps it was the “Barbarossa” episode of “The World at War”。 In any case， it was the latter that laid down the template for the dominant narrative of Barbarossa as I understood it: massive German successes in the early stages， scuppered by Hitler’s strategic blunders and the Russian ability to take advantage of those blunders through sheer weight of numbers。David Stahel’s substantial book aims to rewrite the dominant narrative， replacing it with a more nuanced picture and arguing that Germany’s defeat on the Eastern Front was assured from the moment that the opening Blitzkrieg failed to destroy the Red Army’s capacity to resist; in Stahel’s telling， Germany’s attack was doomed from the start， undermined by bad planning， unrealistic expectations， inadequate logistic provision， underestimation of the enemy’s capacities， unclear strategic aims， and a divided leadership group working at cross-purposes。Stahel’s makes a convincing - indeed an exhausting - case。 His book is particularly strong when he covers the technical/operational/tactical levels， painting a clear picture of how the German army’s poor logistics and inadequate numbers created a dynamic whereby the ever-expanding front could not be defended and the offensive spearhead could not press forward to deliver the necessary knock-out blow。The research is rich and detailed， and the content equally so。 My main caveats concern focus and editing: sometimes the narrative switches tracks without sufficient signposting; the text is somewhat repetitive; and the prose is overly heavy with adjectives and woefully short of appropriate commas。 There’s also a puzzling lack of attention paid to the interrelationship between the campaign and the mass killing that came in its wake - even though Stahel touches on this aspect in his Conclusion， for me it is not really covered explicitly enough in the text for him to warrant his conclusions in this regard。Overall， though， I found this very impressive， and it has enriched and transformed my understanding of Barbarossa over June-August 1941。 Stahel has written a series of books on the subsequent phases of the Eastern Front war， and I look forward to reading those too， with equal profit。 。。。more
Lloyd
，
If you’ve ever wondered how Germany could advance so deeply and so swiftly in the heart of European Russia and then fail to defeat Russia， you must read this book。 It is an excellent recounting of why the invasion of Russia in 1941 （code named Barbarossa） failed。 It is told primarily from the standpoint of the German perspective。 What were their plans， who were the critical field generals as well as the High Command members and of course， Hitler。 All the mistakes are there and explained， both th If you’ve ever wondered how Germany could advance so deeply and so swiftly in the heart of European Russia and then fail to defeat Russia， you must read this book。 It is an excellent recounting of why the invasion of Russia in 1941 （code named Barbarossa） failed。 It is told primarily from the standpoint of the German perspective。 What were their plans， who were the critical field generals as well as the High Command members and of course， Hitler。 All the mistakes are there and explained， both the planning mistakes and the errors in execution of the plan。 This is a very readable history and very informative recounting of the war in the East。 。。。more
Nicholas Grace
，
This is one of the most interesting books I have read recently。 The research is excellent and well presented with detailed information and a logical format。 It certainly shows a reality away from the myth that is so often stated。 You might go into this book with the idea of German military supremacy and you will see how actually this isn't necessarily the case。 What is an important point in this book is comparing the contemporary reports and diaries with the post-war versions published by many o This is one of the most interesting books I have read recently。 The research is excellent and well presented with detailed information and a logical format。 It certainly shows a reality away from the myth that is so often stated。 You might go into this book with the idea of German military supremacy and you will see how actually this isn't necessarily the case。 What is an important point in this book is comparing the contemporary reports and diaries with the post-war versions published by many of the generals involved。 It is interesting to note the difference and lack of co-operation。 It is also interesting to see the condition of the Red Army at this time and the differences in area commands and equipment。 For anyone wanting to know about the myth about the Soviets planning to invade Germany， this is also covered in the book in some detail。This is a great book for anyone who already has knowledge or wants to read more。 。。。more
Mike Dahlstrom
，
A monumental work of scholarship and a successful take on revisionist history from the mythos too often attributed to the German Army by Anglo-American historians。 Drawing heavily from primary sources， Stahel uses the unguarded diaries and correspondence of the campaign to vividly illustrate an army at war with itself and with its Führer。 The book covers the planning and the first summer of Barbarossa， and makes clear that by August of 1941， the German invasion was doomed to failure， bringing do A monumental work of scholarship and a successful take on revisionist history from the mythos too often attributed to the German Army by Anglo-American historians。 Drawing heavily from primary sources， Stahel uses the unguarded diaries and correspondence of the campaign to vividly illustrate an army at war with itself and with its Führer。 The book covers the planning and the first summer of Barbarossa， and makes clear that by August of 1941， the German invasion was doomed to failure， bringing down Hitler and National Socialism with it。 A truly outstanding book。 。。。more
Antony Dayal
，
A fresh lookThis is a great read for those interested in the eastern front。 David Stahel lays out in a methodical way the seeds of failure in the planning of barbarossa， and the way hubris blinded the German Generals。Stable challenges the traditional view of the eastern front。 Challenges the readers to look beyond the normal portrayal of a victorious German army sweeping the Soviet forces aside。 Shows how every step lengthened the supply lines and bleed the armies man power。A great read。
Pierfrancesco Aiello
，
A book full of novel details （for me at least） regarding the approach of nazi Germany on the eastern front。 Suggested。Some more notes: while， as written， the amount of novel details - which other historians perhaps consider not important to mention， but those are important - that put in perspective the German advance in the East is welcomed， for example the exhausting marches done by the infantry， the rate of break down of vehicles and so on; it seems that the author tends to downplay some infor A book full of novel details （for me at least） regarding the approach of nazi Germany on the eastern front。 Suggested。Some more notes: while， as written， the amount of novel details - which other historians perhaps consider not important to mention， but those are important - that put in perspective the German advance in the East is welcomed， for example the exhausting marches done by the infantry， the rate of break down of vehicles and so on; it seems that the author tends to downplay some information。 Did the Germans capture 250+ thousand prisoners after reducing a pocket， but left 50 thousand escape？ That is exposed almost as a defeat， while it is far from it。 Did the Soviet field 15000 t26 and bt tanks？ Those were obsolete and if the Germans destroyed them there is no merit。 Well no， the author himself explains that the large part of the German tanks were obsolete as well and could be taken down by t26 and bt tanks。 So let's say that the attitude of the author is a bit too focused on downplaying the success of the German forces。 While the German success was far from being awesome， for example reading of infantry divisions marching 50 km per day for several days is already showing the weakness of the German army （because such marches almost put soldiers out of combat）， it is not so honest to dismiss events as "easy" where those were not easy at all in theory。 （a t26 could have good chances to destroy a 38t for example） 。。。more
Phil
，
Explains why Germany was destined to lose。
Rommel Cesena
，
This should be the first book anyone should read about the invasion of Russia。 Stahel looks at the usually ignored issues that plagued the german army from the beginning and gives a clear view of operations throughout the war。 This book will help readers de-bunk most myths about the Germans that you'll read in other accounts and will help you have a balanced understanding of what really went on。 This should be the first book anyone should read about the invasion of Russia。 Stahel looks at the usually ignored issues that plagued the german army from the beginning and gives a clear view of operations throughout the war。 This book will help readers de-bunk most myths about the Germans that you'll read in other accounts and will help you have a balanced understanding of what really went on。 。。。more
Philip Kuhn
，
Excellent book。 I love any book that turns conventional wisdom on its head and this sure does。 Stahel destroys the myth that the mighty Wermacht only lost the war because of Hitler's meddling。 Not true。 They attempted in the USSR to do too much with too little men and equipment。 The German generals failed to put any breaks on Hitler's meglomania， and in fact， fed it more with their "sure we can do that。 Conquer the Soviets in 2 month--no problem。"It's and excellent book and a real military histo Excellent book。 I love any book that turns conventional wisdom on its head and this sure does。 Stahel destroys the myth that the mighty Wermacht only lost the war because of Hitler's meddling。 Not true。 They attempted in the USSR to do too much with too little men and equipment。 The German generals failed to put any breaks on Hitler's meglomania， and in fact， fed it more with their "sure we can do that。 Conquer the Soviets in 2 month--no problem。"It's and excellent book and a real military history。 The author states in introduction that a military history is his purpose。Five Stars。Philip J Kuhn 。。。more
Jackie Griffin
，
The author's premise is that the outcome of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union was determined not by the long winter or the strength of the Soviet army。 Rather， it was determined by German arrogance， a lack of planning for logistics and the amazing lack of intelligence gathering before the invasion。 The book makes a good case for all of these factors。 However， it does not persuade me that the war could not have been won on the Eastern front even after The initial operation failed。 Many factor The author's premise is that the outcome of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union was determined not by the long winter or the strength of the Soviet army。 Rather， it was determined by German arrogance， a lack of planning for logistics and the amazing lack of intelligence gathering before the invasion。 The book makes a good case for all of these factors。 However， it does not persuade me that the war could not have been won on the Eastern front even after The initial operation failed。 Many factors， including the US entering the war may have been more decisive。 The author makes the additional case that Hitler truly felt that Churchill would see Germany's attack on the Soviet a union as a good thing and negotiate a peace。 And， that the systematic annihilation of the Jews began when he perceived that his prediction of a world war started by Jews was beginning to occur when Churchill and Roosevelt met and began to supply the Soviet Union。 。。。more
Juan Patricio
，
Well documented research。 First chapter and final conclusions are superb。
Jim Pfluecke
，
This is an excellent book that looks at why the Germans lost their war against the Soviet Union。 Althought the campaign opened with a long series of tremendous victories by the Germans， including the capture， over the first few months， of literally millions of Soviet soldiers， they were unable to completely break the Soviet Army and force the Soviet's to surrender。 This book examines the activities of Operation Barbarossa， mostly in the central portion of the theater， to show why that despite wi This is an excellent book that looks at why the Germans lost their war against the Soviet Union。 Althought the campaign opened with a long series of tremendous victories by the Germans， including the capture， over the first few months， of literally millions of Soviet soldiers， they were unable to completely break the Soviet Army and force the Soviet's to surrender。 This book examines the activities of Operation Barbarossa， mostly in the central portion of the theater， to show why that despite winning the battles and encicling whole armies， the Germans were not prepared to support the invasion and keep their army in the field for more than a few months and had a strategy that did not mesh with reality。In summary Stahel argues， successfully imho， that （1） the Germans could not sustain operations long enough to reach their strategice goals， （2） that the Germans strategy was flawed anyway， counting on the Soviets fo collapse internally after losing the frontier battles， and （3） the Soviets fought so hard and， at times， quite well， to cuase horrific losses on the Germans and eroded the German's ability to keep attacking。 While none of these ideas are new， the strength of this book is tieing together operational details with the strategic details and the bigger picture issues （poor prepration by the Germans， etc）。 。。。more
Allen
，
A very detailed look at the first two months of Operation Barbarossa from the perspective of German Army Group Central。 It shows how Germany totally underestimated the resolve of the Red Army and over estimated their logistics ability。 The grinding down of the German Blitzkrieg and lack of agreement on strategic objectives meant the German Army could not defeat the Soviet Union in 1941， which essentially meant they could not win the war。 Making the same mistakes as Napoleon， Germany essentially A very detailed look at the first two months of Operation Barbarossa from the perspective of German Army Group Central。 It shows how Germany totally underestimated the resolve of the Red Army and over estimated their logistics ability。 The grinding down of the German Blitzkrieg and lack of agreement on strategic objectives meant the German Army could not defeat the Soviet Union in 1941， which essentially meant they could not win the war。 Making the same mistakes as Napoleon， Germany essentially lost the war the day they invaded， as did Napoleon。 It was not the winter weather， it was the distances， lack of infrastructure and total inability to resupply men and machines lost。 The High Command， from Hitler on down were unable to see the problems or admit them。 To a great extent it was because they were fighting based on the lessons of the First World War。 。。。more
Avempace
，
There are myths surrounding operation Barbarossa， the 1941 Nazi Germany invasion of the Soviet Union， that persist in the popular imagination to this day。 For all appearances the Germans were invincible: they conquered vast territory， defeated many Russian armies who must have fought very poorly or not at all， evidenced by the millions of prisoners the Germans took in the process。 They would have reached Moscow were they not thwarted by severe winter weather and snow。 In short， as if in a retell There are myths surrounding operation Barbarossa， the 1941 Nazi Germany invasion of the Soviet Union， that persist in the popular imagination to this day。 For all appearances the Germans were invincible: they conquered vast territory， defeated many Russian armies who must have fought very poorly or not at all， evidenced by the millions of prisoners the Germans took in the process。 They would have reached Moscow were they not thwarted by severe winter weather and snow。 In short， as if in a retelling of a Norse saga， they were only defeated because they dared defy the gods of natural elements。 As meticulous scholarship has shown， nothing could have been further from the truth。 In books such as Weinberg's the World at Arms， Tooze's the Wages of Destruction， Glantz's Barbarossa Derailed and here Stahel's Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East， the origin of the defeat was revealed rooted in German calculations and actions and Russian reactions， not in the elements， which as Glantz and others wryly commented， happen to affect both parties。 Germany did not have the strategic depth （industrial， population） to challenge the Russians or for that matter the US and England， and certainly not the three together。 The Germans grossly underestimated their foe， who fought the invasion with absolute tenacity and fearsome resistance all the way from the start of the hostilities until the fall of Berlin in 1945。 Even in the darkest days of the summer of 1941， the Soviet front never lost its cohesion。 There were always fresh Soviet armies to fight the next battle。 Even when surrounded and doomed， the Russians again and again fought on。 "Ivan" was no push over。 What Stahel articulates in this book， and as such adds to our knowledge of the failure of Barbarossa， is a deep understanding of the inchoate German strategic planning: the fundamental division of opinion on the objectives of the war that emerged between Hitler and the army leadership， which resulted in inescapable confusion and problems as the operation went underway。 Whereas Hitler focused on destroying Russian forces and conquering Russian territory that is relevant economically to the outcome of the global war， with Moscow being a secondary objective， the army leadership focused obsessively on the need to take Moscow as the pivotal knockout event of the war。 This basic confusion about the aims of the war lead to a serious clash of visions that was detrimental to the execution and outcome of the operation。 By focusing on German archives， Stahel documents gross incompetence when it comes to the planning of Barbarossa by the German staff: inability to properly size up their enemy without blinkers and racial biases， and a sense of smug superiority that blinded the German staff to the results of their own war games and analyses。 Ironically， the latter were conducted by none other than Friedrich Paulus of Stalingrad fame， who on the eve of Barbarossa was deputy chief of the General Staff。 The Germans threw themselves into battle with little understanding of the foe they were to face。 We now know through the work of Stahel， Glantz and others that militarily Brabarossa did not fail at the gates of Moscow but much earlier， perhaps as early as the summer battles of Smolensk。 With Stahel's analysis， the failure occurred even earlier， at the planning and staging phases。 Stahel's is a carefully researched book on the subject that is a pleasure to read， though it does demand patient attention。 It is focused exclusively on the German archives， which is a limitation though not a shortcoming as such。 For the student of WWII， other books that explore the Russian and other archives would nicely complement Stahel's research。 Overall very highly recommended。 。。。more
Varun
，
An excellent work on the failure of The german army over extending and the reasons behind the catastrophic failure。 The। dilemmas， self interest and faulty। war plans coupled with the Hitler factor。
David Levine
，
Highly recommended - David Stahel spent tons of time in the German archives bringing us an excellent revisionist history which does not just tell the same eastern front story over and over again。 The point is simply that long before day one， the Germans had lost。 They were replaying their novel French victory and projecting it on to everything。 As such， long before they invaded Russia the had lost because they had fundamentally misread the situation。 And， to believe that attacking Russia was a w Highly recommended - David Stahel spent tons of time in the German archives bringing us an excellent revisionist history which does not just tell the same eastern front story over and over again。 The point is simply that long before day one， the Germans had lost。 They were replaying their novel French victory and projecting it on to everything。 As such， long before they invaded Russia the had lost because they had fundamentally misread the situation。 And， to believe that attacking Russia was a way to get at the UK was the ultimate hubris: this was the same damn reason that Napoleon attacked Russia - to knock Russia our of the war and remove England's last hope。 That the Eastern Front became the "main war" is now widely known。 。。。more
Jonathan
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An in-depth examination of the planning and execution of the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany， why Operation Barbarossa failed and how this failure became the decisive campaign of the Second World War， dooming the Germans to defeat。 Cogently written， the focus of the narrative is the battles of Army Group Center （the most powerful and important of the three army groups deployed） and its battles up until the end of August 1941， as well as the resulting conflicts within the German high An in-depth examination of the planning and execution of the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany， why Operation Barbarossa failed and how this failure became the decisive campaign of the Second World War， dooming the Germans to defeat。 Cogently written， the focus of the narrative is the battles of Army Group Center （the most powerful and important of the three army groups deployed） and its battles up until the end of August 1941， as well as the resulting conflicts within the German high command as the campaign progressed。 Dr。 Stahel maintains that the Wehrmacht never really had the slightest chance of winning this battle and he skillfully uses the sources to back up his contention。 Without going into too many details， here's how it went down: Firstly， the level of German military， economic and geographic intelligence about the Soviet Union was abysmal。 Secondly， the profoundly racist outlook of the Nazi state absurdly inflated the abilities of the German military （"The German soldier can do anything！"） and belittled the combat capabilities of the Russians， who turned out to be able to fight much harder and skillfully than expected， as the Germans themselves would ruefully admit。 The operational concept of the invasion was deeply flawed as well， expecting that the Red Army would be destroyed in the first 6 to 8 weeks of the campaign before the Germans would reach the Dnepr-Dvina line。 Finally， given the vast distances involved， the logistical resources available to support this huge battle were utterly， ridiculously inadequate to the task。 It's hard to argue with Dr。 Stahel's conclusion that the professional reputations of the German officers who planned and carried out Operation Barbarossa have been inflated beyond their true quality。 One should remember that the emphasis in this book is on the progress of AG Center， and that the maps （excellent reprints from books by David Glantz） are only of that unit。 Dr。 Stahel has the knack for making sense of a gigantic and complicated operation， not a skill every military historian possesses。 An important addition to our knowledge of the Eastern Front in WWII。 。。。more
Peter Lesnik
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this is singularly the best written book ever on the invasion。i believe this is Stahel's doctorate thesis and he's written a very READABLE book。 this is singularly the best written book ever on the invasion。i believe this is Stahel's doctorate thesis and he's written a very READABLE book。 。。。more
Militaryreader
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